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REIMBURSEMENT FOR VOLUNTARILY CLEANING UP YOUR
MESS? THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SAYS YES UNDER CERCLA*
Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. North
American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") in order to
address rising public concerns about the inadequacy of response measures
to environmental risks and health hazards of improper waste disposal.2
CERCLA was enacted to provide a way to decrease and control problems
related to abandoned and inactive hazardous water disposal sites, 3 and to
shift cleanup costs of the contamination to responsible parties. 4 Under
CERCLA, Congress gave the federal government broad authority to
regulate hazardous substances, to respond to hazardous substance
emergencies, and to develop long-term solutions for the Nation's most
serious hazardous waste problems.5 While CERCLA provides two causes
of action in which a potentially responsible party ("PRP") may recover
cleanup costs, either through a joint and several cost recovery action6 or a
* Subsequent to the completion of this article, the United States Supreme Court abrogated
E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006), holding
that CERCLA provides a potentially responsible party with a cause of action to recover,
from other potentially responsible parties, costs incurred in voluntarily cleaning up a
contaminated site. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2338-39
(2007). However, the Court reserved judgment on whether clean-up costs incurred by a
potentially responsible party pursuant to a consent decree following an EPA
administrative enforcement action are recoverable under Section 107(a), Section 113(f),
or both. Id. at 2338. See infra, section V. Comment and accompanying text.
437 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. (Ill.)).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(hereafter "CERCLA" §§ 101-175).
3 H. R. Rep. No. 96-1016, at 1.
4 See Megrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).
See CERCLA § § 101-175.6 Id. at § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
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contribution action,7 the shifting of cleanup costs to responsible parties
has been the result of much litigation for a number of federal courts. It is
the issue of cleanup cost recovery by a voluntary PRP that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed in Metropolitan Water v. North
American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.9
The Metropolitan Water case turns on the interpretation of the
Supreme Court's holding of an implied cause of action under section
107(a) in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 1 an analysis of
three federal courts of appeals' opinions regarding the right of a PRP to
bring suit under section 107(a) and a breakdown of the statutory language
of section 107(a)." This case note will explore the legislative and case
history leading up to the Metropolitan Water decision and attempt to point
out that, although the Seventh Circuit comes to the correct legal result, its
lack of analysis pertaining to the policy of CERCLA and its environmental
goals leave open the possibility that a PRP who voluntarily performs
cleanup will still be unable to bring a cost recovery action under section
107(a).
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Over the course of approximately fifty years industrial chemicals
spilled into the soil and groundwater on South Harlem Avenue, about one
quarter mile north of Stevenson Expressway in Forest View, Illinois.12 i
2003, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Chicago
("Metropolitan Water") filed suit against Lake River Corporation ("Lake
River") under CERCLA and the Superfund Amendments and
Id. § 113(f).
8 See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004); Bedford
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30
F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994);
Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005);
Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006); E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006).
9 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 437 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007) (hereafter "Metro. Water").
'0 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
" Metro. Water, 437 F.3d 824, 832-36.
12 Id. at 825.
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Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") to recover cleanup costs arising
from the contamination. 13
The contaminated property, approximately fifty acres, is owned by
Metropolitan Water.14 Metropolitan Water entered into a long-term lease
with Lake River in the late 1940s.15 Lake River is a wholly owned
subsidiary of North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc. ("North
American").' 6 Lake River constructed a facility "to store, mix and
package industrial chemicals for its own use and for the use of its
customers."17 The fifty acres contained above-ground storage tanks that
retained large quantities of chemicals. 18 This was a part of Lake River's
operations. These chemicals arrived at the property through truck,
barge, and rail.20
Lake River's storage tanks were prone to leaks.21 Over the fifty-
plus years Lake River leased Metropolitan Water's property, it was
alleged that the tanks spilled close to 12,000 gallons of industrial
chemicals into the soil and groundwater. 22 These toxins were "hazardous
substances"23 and "posed an imminent danger to the environment." 24
Metropolitan Water incurred "substantial expenses" investigating,
monitoring, and remedying the contaminated portions of its property. 25
Metropolitan Water filed its complaint with the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in February 2003 to










23 The toxins were "hazardous substances" as defined under CERCLA. See CERCLA §
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asserted a claim for recovery costs under CERCLA sectionl07(a)2 or an
alternative claim for contribution under CERCLA section 113(f).2 ' When
Lake River failed to answer the complaint, a default judgment was entered
for Lake River to pay approximately $1.8 million in damages to
Metropolitan Water.29 This was in addition to future response costs.3o
Later, Metropolitan Water amended the complaint to include North
American as a defendant, realleging the CERCLA counts.31 North
American moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 32 The district court, in ruling on the motion,
distinguished between the two asserted CERCLA claims. Under section
107(a)'s liability provisions, the district court found an implied right of
action for cost recovery in cases "where a party is seeking direct recovery
of costs incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site." 34 The court
described section 113(f)'s claims for contribution as brought by
"potentially responsible parties," or "PRPs," that want to divide damages
among themselves. 35 The district court found that Metropolitan Water was
a PRP under CERCLA's strict liability framework because it owned the
property during the period of contamination. 36 While PRPs are normally
limited to contribution claims under section 113(f), rather than the full cost
of remediation under the joint and several recovery of section 107(a),
since Metropolitan Water had commenced cleanup voluntarily and not
27 Id. See CERCLA § 107(a).
28 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 825-26. See CERCLA § 113(f). Metropolitan Water also
asserted state law claims for nuisance and breach of contract. Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at
826.
29 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 826.
30 id




35 Id. The district court said that a contrary outcome "would seem to lie contrary to the
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under compliance with a civil action, Metropolitan Water did not have a
contribution right under section 113(f). 37
The district court then held that, "for [those] PRPs that voluntarily
undertake cleanup, an implied right to contribution under section 107(a)
[is] available [despite] their status as strictly liable parties under the
statute."38 North American's motion was granted in part and denied in
part. 39
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the
judgment of the district court on January 17, 2007, holding that
Metropolitan Water had an implied right to contribution under the cost
recovery of CERCLA section 107(a). 40 The Seventh Circuit found when a
PRP has voluntarily provided cleanup to a hazardous site and has neither
settled liability with a government entity nor been the subject of a
CERCLA suit for damages, the Supreme Court's recognition of an implied
cause of action in section 107(a) 41 along with that subsection's plain
language in which a "responsible party .. . shall be liable for. . . any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person. . ." allow for an
action to be brought under section 107(a) to recover necessary response
costs.42
" Id. CERCLA § 113(f)(1) (allowing contribution only "during or following any civil
action").38 id
39 Id. North American's motion to dismiss was granted as to the claims for common law
nuisance and contribution under CERCLA § 113(f)(1). Id. Metropolitan Water was
found to have an implied right to contribution under cost recovery provision of CERCLA,
therefore, North American's motion to dismiss was denied under § 107(a). Id.
4 Id. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") submitted its views as amicus
curiae and Metropolitan Water and North American filed supplemental briefs in
response.
41 See Key Tropic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994); Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004) (hereafter "Cooper Indus.").42 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 834-35. The Seventh Circuit reviewed decisions from the
Second, Third, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Id The Seventh Circuit agreed
with the conclusions found by the Second and Eighth Circuit decisions and a dissent
opinion in the Third Circuit. See Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Util.,
Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (hereafter Consol. Edison"); E.I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 528 (3d Cir. 2006) (hereafter "DuPont"); Atl.
Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006), respectively.
531
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No. 3
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The reasoning in Metropolitan Water is a recent application of the
limited holding of Cooper Industries, along with an analysis of the
rationales of other federal circuit courts' decisions about the authorization
of a cause of action under section 107(a) by potentially liable parties that
commence cleanup voluntarily. 43 An examination of the legislative history
and case law surrounding CERCLA will set the grounds for insight into
the Metropolitan Water decision.
A. Legislative History
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA in order to address rising
public concerns about the inadequacy of response measures to
environmental risks and health hazards of improper waste disposal."
CERCLA was enacted to decrease and control problems related to
abandoned and inactive hazardous water disposal siteS45 and to shift
cleanup costs of the contamination to responsible parties. 46 Under
CERCLA, Congress gave the federal government broad authority to
regulate hazardous substances, to respond to hazardous substance
emergencies, and to develop long-term solutions for the Nation's most
serious hazardous waste problems. 4 7
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is in charge of the
enforcement of CERCLA.48 The EPA publicized regulations under the
National Contingency Plan ("NCP") that specify how response actions to
releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants are to be completed and what standard the actions will be
measured against for consistency.49 If the EPA deems a specific site an
imminent threat, the EPA can issue a compliance order or obtain a court
43 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 829, 832-37.
" Id. at 826. See CERCLA § § 101-175.
45 H. R. Rep. No. 96-1016, at 1.
46 See Megrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,483 (1996).
47 See CERCLA §§ 101-175.
48 See CERCLA §§ 104, 106.
49 See CERCLA § 105; The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.
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injunction that directs any responsible party to cleanup the
contamination.5 0 The EPA may also cleanup the contamination using its
own money out of the Hazardous Substances Superfund.51 If the EPA
provides the cleanup efforts, the agency may recover its costs from any
responsible party.52
The EPA normally uses five major efforts to compel PRPs to
perform the cleanup.53 Initially the EPA identifies the PRPs and sends
notice to each PRP informing them of their potential liability under
CERCLA.54 The EPA will then request voluntary participation of the PRP
in the cleanup.ss Next, if the EPA believes the PRP can provide the
cleanup, the EPA will attempt to facilitate negotiation of a settlement
agreement, which involves a proposal for cleaning up the pollution under
the assumption of PRP liability.56 The enforcement agreement may be
either judicial or administrative, but under both agreements the EPA
oversees the PRP. If a settlement is not reached, the EPA can seek an
injunction in federal district court forcing the PRP to act or issue an
administrative order pursuant to CERCLA section 104(e) or 106(a)
'o See CERCLA § 106(a).
51 See Id. § 104. This fund was created by CERCLA and is financed through
appropriations, EPA fees and industry taxes. Id. § 105.
PSee Id. § 107.
s3 Environmental Fact Sheet The Superfund Enforcement Process: How It Works, Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Waste Programs Enforcement,
Summer 1988, United States Environmental Protection Agency, available at
www.smallbiz-enviroweb.org/pub_video/epadocs/ddocs/dl5.pdf.
54 d
5 See CERCLA § 122 (explained at Environmental Fact Sheet The Superfund
Enforcement Process: How It Works, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Office of Waste Programs Enforcement, Summer 1988, United States Environmental
Protection Agency, available at www.smallbiz-
enviroweb.org/pub video/epadocs/ddocs/d 1 5.pdf).
56 Id. (explained at Environmental Fact Sheet The Superfund Enforcement Process: How
It Works, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Waste Programs
Enforcement, Summer 1988, United States Environmental Protection Agency, available
at www.smallbiz-enviroweb.org/pubvideo/epadocs/ddocs/dl5.pdf).
57 Environmental Fact Sheet The Superfund Enforcement Process: How It Works, Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Waste Programs Enforcement,
Summer 1988, United States Environmental Protection Agency, available at
www.smallbiz-enviroweb.org/pubvideo/epadocs/ddocs/dl5.pdf.
533
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No. 3
demanding the PRP to perform the cleanup.5 8 Finally, if the PRPs do not
perform the response action and the EPA removes the contamination
itself, it will file suit against the PRP(s) for reimbursement.
Under CERCLA, a party may recover cleanup costs from other
PRPs in one of two causes of action: a joint and several cost recovery
action60 or a contribution action. Liability for the cleanup of sites
contaminated by hazardous substances is established under section 107(a)
of CERCLA.62 Parties are liable under CERCLA for "all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the government or a private party and any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan." 63 In order to establish liability, the
government or a private party must establish the contaminated site is a
65facility," the defendant is a potentially responsible party, a release or
s8 See CERCLA §§ 104(e), 106(a).
5 Id. § 107(a).
6 Id. § 107(a). Under joint and several liability any party can be held responsible for the
entire cost of cleanup or other response costs. Id. A private party can also recoup all
recoverable costs from any responsible party. The statute of limitations for most cost
recovery claims is six years. Id. § 1 13(g)(2).
61 Id. § 113(f). Under contribution, a responsible party may only recover an equitable
share of cleanup and response costs from other PRPs. The statute of limitations for a
contribution action is three years. Id. § 11 3(g)(3).62 Id. § 107(a). Although § 107(a) establishes liability for a cost recovery action, the
same elements must also be established when seeking contribution under § 113(f)
because this section allows a party to seek contribution only from a person who is liable
or potentially liable under § 107. See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d
849, 855 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 2001). Sections 107(a) and 113(f) were codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(a) and 9613(f). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f).
61 Id. § 107(a)(4)(B). In order for private parties to recover corresponding cleanup costs,
the actions must be necessary and "incurred consistent with the NCP." See CERCLA §
101(23) (definition of "removal"), § 101(24) (definition of "remedial action").
6 Id. § 107. A facility is defined as:
[a]ny building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon,
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or
aircraft, or any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
Id. § 101(9).
65 Id. § 107(a). The four classes of PRPs are:
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threat of release of a hazardous substance 6 6 has occurred at the facility, 67
and the release or threatened release has caused the government or a
private party to incur "necessary" response costs consistent with the
NCP.68
The original enactment of CERCLA did not expressly provide for
a right of contribution. 69 In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA through
the use of Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") to
authorize an express action for contribution. 70 Under CERCLA section
113(f)(1), "Any person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable" for response costs under section 107(a)
"during or following any civil action" under CERCLA section 106 or
section 107(a).7 1 Also, encouragement to settle was provided such that any
party that settled with the government was insulated from being sued in a
contribution action.72 When a contribution claim was asserted by a private
party, the claim was subjected to the court's discretion to allocate costs
among liable parties.7 3 Section 113(f)(1) also contained a savings clause
[c]urrent owners of operators of a site; past owners or operators of a site at the
time hazardous substances were disposed of at the site; anyone who arranged for
the disposal, transport or treatment of hazardous substances found at the site;
and anyone who accepted hazardous substances for disposal and selected the site
now slated for cleanup.
Id. § 107(a)(1)-(4).
6 A hazardous substance is defined by reference to substances defined as hazardous in
other environmental statutes. See the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6921; the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a); and the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7412. Petroleum is specifically exempted from CERCLA's definition of
hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).61CERCLA § 107(a).68id.
69 See CERCLA §§ 101-175.70 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (hereafter "SARA"). SARA amended CERCLA to add CERCLA § 113,42 U.S.C.
§ 9613. Id.
71 CERCLA § 113(f)(1). Section 106 authorized the Federal Government to compel
responsible parties to clean up contaminated areas. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994).
721Id. § 113(f)(2).
7 Id. § 113(0(1). "In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate." Id.
535
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that provided: "Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under" section 106 or 107.74 From the resulting legislation, courts have
produced a variety of interpretations of when cost recovery actions are
appropriate under section 107(a) and when contribution is necessary under
section 113(f). 75
B. Judicial Interpretation
When the contribution claim joined cost recovery as a cause of
action to recover cleanup costs from a hazardous waste site under
CERCLA, the contested question of whether the right of contribution was
now the only cause of action available to a PRP seeking to recover its
cleanup costs arose, given that PRPs who had spent money in remedying a
site or settling liability wished to seek joint and several cost recovery
under section 107(a).76 Each circuit to decide this question held that,
generally, PRPs could not seek cost recovery under section 107(a), and
that "any claim seeking to shift costs from one responsible party to another
must be brought as a section 113(f) claim for contribution." 7 7
In Bedford Affiliates v. Sills,78 the Second Circuit stated that any
action by one PRP against another to equitably apportion liability was a
"quintessential claim for contribution" and it would be unfair to allow a
PRP to recover "100 percent of the response costs from others similarly
situated." 7 9 The court referenced a group of circuit court opinions which
reasoned that if a PRP were allowed to recover under section 107(a) it
74 d
7s See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004); Bedford
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30
F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994);
Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005);
Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006); E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006).
76 See id.
7 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d at 828 (citing seven cases from the Ist, 2d, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, and
10th circuits).
78 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998).
7 9 Id. at 424.
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would leave section 113(f) meaningless, since a PRP "would readily
abandon a section 113(f)(1) suit in favor of the substantially more
generous provisions of section 107(a)."8 0 The Seventh Circuit adopted this
reasoning in Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.8 1 when it held that a
claim "by and between jointly and severally liable parties for an
appropriate division of the payment one of them has been compelled to
make" appears in contribution, and therefore, must be brought under
section 113(f). 82
Because CERCLA's strict liability can provide for a large number
of potentially liable parties,8 3 the "innocent landowner" exception
developed in case law. This exception provides that cost recovery under
section 107(a) remains available to landowners who allege they did not
pollute the site in any way. 84 The "innocent landowner" defense excludes
from liability those "innocent" landowners who did not know and had no
reason to know that the property was contaminated at the time of
purchase; reacted responsibly when they found the contamination; and
made reasonable inquiries into the past uses of the property before the
purchase to determine whether the property was contaminated. In
Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit decided that a dump owner, who was strictly
liable for, but had not actually contributed to the "cocktail of hazardous
wastes" that had been deposited at the dump by a nearby recycling
company, could maintain a direct cost recovery claim under section
107(a).86 The court emphasized the fact that the dump owner had not been
subject to either government or private obligation to initiate cleanup, the
8 0 Id. See Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d
769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,
1120 (3d Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496
(11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colo. & Eastern R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995); United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir.
1994); Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764.
8 30 F3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
82Id. at 764.
83 CERCLA § 107(a).
8 Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir.
1997). The "innocent landowner" exception originated in Akzo Coating, Inc. v. Aigner
Corp. See Akzo Coating, Inc. v. Aigner Corp. 30 F3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).8 5 See Cross, Establishing Environmental Innocence, 23 Real Est. L.J. 332 (Spring 1995).8 6 Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240.
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dump undertook cleanup on its own, and the dump maintained that it
shared no actual responsibility for the site and was not trying to divide up
its own liability or apportion costs.8 7
The right of private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs was
addressed in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States.8 8 Although the issue
before the court was attorney's fees, not the availability of a right of action
under section 107(a), the Supreme Court stated that "section 107(a)
unquestionably provides a cause of action for [PRPs] to seek recovery of
cleanup costs., 8 Key Tronic, a PRP, asserted a $1.2 million cost recovery
claim under section 107(a) to recoup costs it [allegedly] incurred in
cleaning up its site "at its own initiative." 90 Key Tronic settled with the
EPA on a portion of its claim, but it brought an action for costs incurred
before the EPA's involvement.9 1 The Court explained that under
CERLCA section 107(a)(4)(B), which allows any person who has incurred
costs for cleaning up a hazardous waste site to recover all or a portion of
those costs from any other person liable under CERCLA, an implied cause
of action exists that PRPs "may have a claim for contribution against those
treated as joint tortfeasors." 92
Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court recently discussed
the relationship between sections 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA. 93 In
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,94 the key matter decided
concerned the timing of a contribution claim under section 113(f). 95 In
Cooper Industries, Aviall Services, after having bought four Texas
properties from Cooper Industries, Inc., discovered that both companies
had contaminated the properties when hazardous substances leaked into
the ground and ground water.96 Aviall provided the funds for the
properties' cleanup under Texas' supervision, without being compelled by
87 d. at 1241-42.
88511 U.S. 809 (1994).89 1d at 818.
9 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 1993).
9' Id. at 1026-27.
92 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 & n.11 (1994).
9 See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
94 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
SId.
96 Id. at 157-58.
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the State or Federal Government to provide the cleanup, and then Aviall
brought action against Cooper to recover the costs. 97 Aviall's complaint
was amended to combine a cost recovery claim under section 107(a) and a
separate claim for contribution under section 113(f)(1) into a single, joint
claim that, pursuant to section 113(f)(1), sought contribution from Cooper
98as a PRP under section 107(a). The Supreme Court ultimately held that a
"private party who has not been sued under CERCLA section 106 or
section 107(a) may not obtain contribution under section 113(f)(1) from
other liable parties." 99 Since Aviall had not been the subject of any
enforcement action, and its claim based on section 113(f) was not "during
or following any civil action," 00 section 113(f) did not authorize Aviall's
suit for contribution. 10' The Cooper Industries court noted in dictum that
section 113(f)(1) was not the "exclusive cause of action for contribution
available to a PRP," and an action under section 107(a) was available. 102
Although an implied cause of action was found under section
107(a), the question of if section 107(a) authorized a cause of action by
PRPs that seek recovery costs after voluntary cleanup was not explicitly
addressed until three federal courts were faced with the issue in the
aftermath of Cooper Industries.0 3 In Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., the Second Circuit held that section 107(a)
authorized a suit to recover voluntary response costs "for parties that have
not been sued or made to participate in an administrative proceeding, but
that if sued, would be held liable under section 107(a)."' Consolidated
Edison incurred cleanup costs in remedying hazardous waste
contamination from one of its power plants. 05 It sought reimbursement
97 d
98 Id
9 Id. at 165-69.
'
00 Id. at 165-66.
101 Id
102 Id. at 167.
103 See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d
Cir. 2005); Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006); E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515 (3rd Cir. 2006).
10 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100
(2d Cir. 2005).
'
0 Id. at 95.
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from the operator of one of the plants.106 In the complaint, Consolidated
Edison made claims under both sections 107(a) and 113(f).' 0 7 The Second
Circuit held that contribution was not available since Consolidated Edison
had not been sued under CERCLA section 107 or resolved CERCLA
liability through settlement. 08 Although the court denied contribution
under section 113(f), the court reasoned that denying recovery costs under
section 107(a) would discourage voluntary cleanup and thereby undermine
CERCLA.' 09
The Eighth Circuit also took up the issue in Atlantic Research
Corp. v. United States.110 In Atlantic, a corporation that retrofitted rocket
motors used high-pressure water spray to remove rocket propellant."'
This propellant was then burned and the soil and groundwater at the
service facility was contaminated from the residue of the burnt rocket
fuel.11 2 Atlantic Research Corporation investigated and cleaned up the
contamination voluntarily. " It then sued to recover part of its costs under
CERCLA section 107(a) and 113(f).11 4 After the decision in Cooper
Industries held that a party could only attempt to obtain section 113(f)
contribution "during or following" a section 106 or 107(a) CERCLA civil
action,"1 Atlantic Research Corporation amended its complaint to rely
exclusively on section 107(a) since no action had been brought against
it.116 The Eighth Circuit addressed whether or not "one liable party could
recover costs advanced, beyond its equitable share, from another liable
party in direct recovery, or by section 107 contribution, or as a matter of




10 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
.ll Id. at 829.
112 Id.
114 id
115 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 57, 161 (2004).
116 Atlantic, 459 F.3d at 829.
117 Id. at 834.
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"that it no longer makes sense to view section 113 as a liable party's
exclusive remedy."" 8
However, when the Third Circuit addressed the same issue as the
Second and Eighth Circuits, it reached a different conclusion. In E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States,"9 E.I. DuPont owned 15
industrial facilities throughout the United States. 12 These sites were
contaminated with hazardous waste. 121 E.I. cleaned up the sites
voluntarily 22 but alleged that, although they were partly responsible for
the contamination, the United States Government was also partly
responsible due to their operation of the sites at various times during
World War I, World War II, and/or the Korean War.123 E.I. brought a
contribution action against the Government.124 The district court rejected
E.I. DuPont's claim 25 and DuPont appealed. 126 The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment.12 7 In doing so, the Third Circuit
followed its precedent in holding that "a PRP seeking to offset its cleanup
costs must invoke contribution under section 113.",128 The E.I. DuPont
court stated that nothing in Cooper Industries required it to reevaluate its
precedent.129 The Third Circuit held that "a thorough review of CERCLA,
as amended by SARA, does not support the conclusion [that] because
CERCLA's general goal was to assure prompt and effective cleanups, and
sua sponte cleanups by PRPs may be prompt and effective, those PRPs
must be able to seek contribution."l3 However, the dissenting opinion
stated that after Cooper Industries, the Third Circuit's precedent could no
longer "be reconciled with the policies Congress sought to encourage
118 Id.
119 460 F.3d 515 (2006).120 Id. at 525.
121 Id. at 515.
122 Id. E.I. DuPont was not under a § 106 or § 107 action or a § 113(f)(3) settlement. Id.
at 526.
12 3 Id. at 515, 525.
124M. at 526-27.
125 Id. There were two district court opinions. Id.
126 Id. at 527.
127 id
128 Id. at 528.
129Id. at 532.130Id. at 541.
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when it enacted CERCLA."' 3 ' It is with a view toward the Consolidated
Edison, Atlantic Research, and E.I. DuPont Courts along with the
language of section 107(a) that the Metropolitan Water case was decided.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Metropolitan Water, the Seventh Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals held that the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of
Greater Chicago had an implied right to contribution under the cost
recovery provision of CERCLA.' 32 After an examination of CERCLA and
a discussion of relevant case law by the Supreme Court,133 the Seventh
Circuit focused on what rights of action, if any, were available to
Metropolitan Water under CERCLA.13 4 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the
rationales of various circuit courts' 35 and scrutinized the language of
section 107(a).136
The court began with a view toward the limited holding in Cooper
Industries v. Aviall Services, in which a responsible party must have either
settled its liability with the government or been sued for compliance under
section 106 or costs under section 107(a), before contribution under
section 113(f)(1) would be allowed from other responsible parties.' 37 The
Metropolitan Water court also noted dicta from the Cooper Industries
court that section 113(f)(1) was not the "exclusive cause of action for
contribution available to a PRP," and an implied cause of action existed
under section 107(a).13 8 The court immediately determined that a
contribution action was unavailable to Metropolitan Water since it had not
been subject to an action for damages or compliance under CERCLA.139
3 Id. at 545.
132 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2007).33 See supra, notes and accompanying text.34 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 830.
s35 See supra notes 44-132 and accompanying text.
36 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 834-36.
137 Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
3Id. at 167-71.
3 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 830.
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Following this, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that section 107(a) provided
a cause of action for at least some parties to sue.14 0
After the court recognized case law concerning an implied cause of
action under section 107(a), it next turned to the question of whether
section 107(a) authorized a cause of action by potentially liable parties
that had voluntarily cleaned up the hazardous site without outside
compulsion.141 The court recognized that although Metropolitan Water
was similar to the plaintiff in Key Tronic, as both were PRPs that brought
action under section 107(a), the issues before the respective courts were
different and the opinion in Key Tronic could be used for nothing more
than "approval of a PRP's right to action in these circumstances."1 42
Therefore, the court examined three federal courts of appeal opinions that
had addressed that precise question.143
The Metropolitan Water court first considered the Second Circuit's
opinion in Consolidated Edison, which authorized a suit under section
107(a) to recover voluntary response costs "for parties that have not been
sued or made to participate in an administrative proceeding, but that if
sued, would be held liable under section 107(a)."l 44 The Seventh Circuit
then reflected on the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Atlantic Research "that it
no longer makes sense to view section 113 as a liable party's exclusive
remedy.145 The Eighth Circuit rejected an approach which categorically
deprived a liable party of a section 107 remedy.146 Next, the Seventh
Circuit reviewed the Third Circuit's opinion in E.I. DuPont De
140 1d. at 831-832 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818; Cooper
Industries, 543 U.S. at 163 n. 3 ("The cost recovery remedy of § 107(a)(4)(B) and the
contribution remedy of § 1 13(f)(1) are similar at a general level in that they both allow
private parties to recoup costs from other private parties. But the two remedies are
clearly distinct.").
141 Id. at 832.
1421 d. at 833 n. 11.
143 Id. at 832-34 (examining Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities,
Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005); Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th
Cir. 2006); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515 (3rd Cir.
2006).
'"Id. at 833 (citing Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 100).
145Id. at 833-34 (quoting Atlantic Research, 459 F.3d at 834-35).
146 m
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Nemours.147 The Third Circuit followed its own precedent in which "a
PRP seeking to offset its cleanup costs must invoke contribution under
section 113" and determined that Cooper Industries did not require it to
reevaluate that precedent.14 8 The E.L DuPont court stated that "Congress
intended to allow contribution for settling or sued PRPs as a way to
encourage them to admit their liability, settle with the Government, and
begin expeditious cleanup operations pursuant to a consent decree or other
agreement." 49 In reviewing the E.L DuPont decision, the Seventh Circuit
made note of Judge Sloviter's dissenting opinion.150 After review of the
various appeals courts' decisions, the Metropolitan Water court turned to
the language of section 107(a).' 5 1
The Seventh Circuit began by restating certain parts of section
107(a) relevant to liability. 152 In particular the court reproduced the
portions that "a responsible party . . . shall be liable for . . . all costs of
removal or remedial action . . . and . . . any other necessary costs or
response incurred by any other person." 53 The court noted that "[n]othing
in subsection (B) indicates that a potentially liable party, such as
Metropolitan Water, should not be considered 'any other person' for
purposes of a right of action."l54 "Other" as used in the Code was
interpreted to mean another person besides the United States Government,
a State, or an Indian tribe.'5 The court disagreed with North American's
argument that the term "other" in "any other person" differentiated from
17 Id. at 834.
148 Id. (quoting E.I. DuPont, 460 F.3d at 528, 530).
149 Id. (quoting E.L DuPont, 460 F.3d at 541).
'so Id.
'1 Id. at 835-36.
152 Id. at 835.
'
3 Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(a)(4)). The complete portion of the statue the Seventh
Circuit reproduced is:
[A] responsible party " (4) ... shall be liable for (A) all costs or removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an
Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other
necessary costs or response incurred by any other person consistent with the
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the four categories of potentially responsible parties. 15 The United States
Government, a State, or an Indian tribe "may recover costs 'not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan,' while 'any other person'
is limited to recovery of those costs 'consistent with the national
contingency plan."' 5 7 Therefore, the burden of proof for governmental
entities, as opposed to private parties, is relaxed.' 5
The Metropolitan Water court next scrutinized whether
Metropolitan Water was a "person" and if it had incurred "necessary costs
of response." 5 The court affirmed that Metropolitan Water was a
"person" under CERCLA's definition.160 Since Metropolitan Water's
response costs included investigation, monitoring and clean-up, this also
fell under CERCLA.' 6' The Seventh Circuit held since Metropolitan
Water had neither settled liability with the Government nor been subject to
a CERCLA suit for damages, and Metropolitan Water fell under section
107(a)(4)(B)'s liability provision, Metropolitan Water had adequately
pleaded a cause of action under section 107(a).162
The Seventh Circuit also discussed the policy implications of
prohibiting a suit by a voluntary plaintiff like Metropolitan Water. 163 It
noted that disallowing the suit "would undermine CERCLA's twin aims of
encouraging expeditious, voluntary environmental cleanup while holding
responsible parties accountable for the response costs that their past
activities induced."1'" The court recognized that "in order to further
CERCLA's policies, potentially responsible parties must be allowed to
recover response costs even before they have been sued themselves under
CERCLA or have settled their CERCLA liability with a governmental
entity."l 65 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit in that if
156 id.
1s7 Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), (B)) (emphasis in original opinion).
158 id.
'59id
i60 Id. A "person" can be a "firm" or a "corporation" under the meaning of CERCLA.
CERCLA § 101(21).
161 Id. See CERCLA § 101(25).
162 id
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cost recovery actions were not available to parties that commenced
voluntary cleanup, responsible parties would wait to begin cleanup until
after being sued, due to an inability to be reimburse for those cleanup
costs. 166
As such, when a PRP has voluntarily provided cleanup to a
hazardous site and has neither settled labiality with a government entity
nor been the subject of a CERCLA suit for damages, the Supreme Court's
continued recognition of an implied cause of action in section 107(a) 6 1
along with that subsection's plain language in which a "responsible party .
. . shall be liable for ... any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person . . ." allow for an action to be brought under section
107(a) to recover necessary response costs.168
V. COMMENT
The Seventh Circuit, in analyzing the facts of Metropolitan Water,
tried to take the multitude of scattered background cases and weave a
tightly reasoned decision that would determinatively state how to read
Congress' limits on the reach of CERCLA's liability scheme. They
succeeded. The court became the fourth federal court of appeals to address
the issue of possible cost recovery for a PRP that has voluntarily provided
cleanup but has yet to be sued for liability.1 69 Holding that Metropolitan
Water had an implied right to contribution under the cost recovery
provision of CERCLA, the Seventh Circuit became the third circuit to
sustain that right.170
16Id. See Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 100.
167 See Key Tropic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994); Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004) (hereafter "Cooper Indus.").
161 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 834-35. The Seventh Circuit reviewed decisions from the
Second, Third, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Id. The Seventh Circuit agreed
with the conclusions found by the Second and Eighth Circuit decisions and a dissent
opinion in the Third Circuit. See Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Util.,
Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (hereafter Consol. Edison"); E.I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 528 (3d Cir. 2006) (hereafter "DuPont"); Atl.
Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006), respectively.
'
6 9 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d 824, 832-35 (7th Cir. 2007).
70 Id. at 834-35.
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While the court's reasoning regarding prior circuits' decisions and
the language of CERCLA's section 107(a) is logical and sound, the
environmental policy considerations of CERCLA need to remain at the
forefront of each judgment. The Metropolitan Water court addressed their
concern "that prohibiting [a] suit by a voluntary plaintiff . . . may
undermine CERLCLA's twin aims of encouraging expeditious, voluntary
environmental cleanups while holding responsible parties accountable for
the response costs that their past activities included."l71 However, this
concern seemed almost an afterthought to the court. The Second Circuit,
in Consolidated Edison, reasoned that having parties wait to begin cleanup
until they were sued would undercut CERCLA's goal of "encourage[ing]
private parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup costs by
allowing them to seek recovery from others."172 Metropolitan Water
mentioned this reason but provided no elaboration or development. The
court seemed happy to follow in the footsteps of the prior judgments from
the Second and Eighth Circuits.
In fact, when North American and the EPA responded to this
policy argument, indicating that the United States would lose valuable
settlement leverage if PRPs that performed voluntarily cleanup prior to
being sued were allowed to bring a cost recovery action under section
107(a),173 the Seventh Circuit seemed very sympathetic to their plight.174
The EPA reasoned that PRPs who settle with the government are allowed
protection from contribution suits by other parties, yet they retain the
ability to seek contribution themselves, while PRPs that do not settle
cannot receive contribution under section 113(f) from settling parties, and
therefore, may have disproportionate liability.' 75 The EPA argued if non-
settling parties were allowed to sue under section 107(a) although they
could not under section 113(f), PRPs would be discouraged from settling
with the United States.' 76 The Metropolitan Water court agreed with the
EPA as to the congressional desire that PRPs settle their liability with the
"' Id. at 836.
172 Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 100 (quoting Key Tronic v. United States, 511 U.S.
809, 819 n. 13.
173 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 836.
174Id. at 836-37.
"7 Id. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2).
176Id at 837.
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government. 7 7 However, since those circumstances did not exist in the
present case and no government entity had involved itself in the cleanup,
the EPA had no basis for representation in the case.178
While it is a correct decision that PRPs who voluntarily cleanup
without any threat of suit should be allowed cost recovery from other
PRPs under section 107(a), this court has left open the question of whether
or not a PRP will be allowed cost recovery if the EPA is involved at all, no
matter how minute its involvement. Since the court is very concerned and
sensitive to the EPA's position involving settlement with the government,
the Seventh Circuit seems to be on the edge of disallowing a cost recovery
action if any government entity is involved with a voluntary cleanup
action. This would be unfair and illogical in those situations where the
EPA or government entity is observing cleanup or has been put on notice
of the hazardous waste situation while cleanup efforts are in the beginning
stages. What happens in those situations where notice is given to the EPA
because a party wants to take steps to ensure their cleanup is going well
and the EPA tries to overstep their bounds and get parties to settle for no
apparent reason? Now, a cost recovery action under section 107(a) would
not be available to the responsible parties; only contribution under section
113(f) could occur. CERCLA's goals of encouraging expeditious,
voluntary environmental cleanups while holding responsible parties
accountable for the response costs of their past activities would be
undermined. Although the Seventh Circuit reached a correct decision
regarding the use of cost recovery actions for PRPs that voluntarily
cleanup up hazardous waste without the threat of suit, it is vital that the
environmental policies underlying CERCLA remain in the forefront of a
court's reasoning and not be considered as an afterthought for a decision
already made.
VI. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the evolution of environmental pollution
cases, liability under CERCLA is a difficult and complex area of law.
While a potentially responsible party needs to be liable for the cost of
548
'See CERCLA § 113(f)(2).
"' Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 837.
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cleaning up hazardous waste, they should not be punished, provided they
cleanup voluntarily. Cleanup performed without the past execution or
present or future threat of liability should not prevent a party from seeking
cost recovery under section 107(a). The Metropolitan Water decision
hoped to solidify the cost recovery action available under section 107(a)
for a voluntary cleanup by a PRP without any threat of litigation pending
in following the leads of prior decisions by the Second and Sixth Circuits,
along with a dissent in the Third Circuit. However, the Seventh Circuit,
though reaching a correct decision, leaves the reader wondering about the
possibility of a section 107(a) suit if the EPA or a government entity is in
any way involved with the cleanup. The policy discussion about
CERCLA's environmental aims and the sympathy directed toward the
EPA's argument about leverage concerning settlement negotiations with
the government should put prospective parties on the lookout that a
voluntary cleanup may not result in the cost recovery they seek.
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